Disclaimer: The following blog post is not a reflection of the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s opinion on the below topics.
By Jixiang Hu
Introduction
Early Modern Europe marked an era deeply intertwined with events that laid the foundations of modern civilization. It was an age of radical changes: discovery, reformation, reason, and the emergence of national identity. Scholars who advance the “crisis thesis” argue that these upheavals stemmed from a growing anxiety over the question of legitimate authority, prompting debates and divergent responses.[1] Yet such conditions gave rise to tension and conflict. Due to the contentious nature of these movements, the transformations of the era were rarely peaceful. The Reformation ignited waves of religious intolerance that culminated in tragedies such as the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre; rising nationalism fueled international rivalries; and the growing tension between science and religion often produced academic hostility. At times, these forces erupted into large-scale violence, as seen in the devastation of the Thirty Years’ War. In short, what reigned in Early Modern Europe was “uncertainty and instability.”[2]
However, it was precisely amid this atmosphere of turmoil that new ideals of nonviolence happened to take shape. In Early Modern Europe, the most significant expressions of nonviolence emerged through growing promotions of religious toleration and the practice of pacifism. This study offers a brief exploration of several figures or groups who advanced these nonviolent principles.
I conclude that the roots of nonviolence in Early Modern Europe can be categorized into three distinct strands. First is nonviolence based on enlightened reasoning, as presented by scholars including enlightened thinkers like John Locke and Voltaire. Second is nonviolence rooted in the belief of transcendence, which was practiced by various Radical Reformation communities. Third is what might be termed conditional nonviolence, a position that embraced the irenic ideal yet did not advocate absolute nonviolence, as exemplified by thinkers including Hugo Grotius and Samuel Pufendorf, who emphasized terms like “good faith.” Even within the same strand, individuals sometimes differed in how they understood and demonstrated nonviolence. Aligning with Gene Sharp’s claim that “the motives for using nonviolent action instead of some type of violent action differ widely,” this study seeks to reveal through the lens of Early Modern Europe that nonviolence was not a uniform doctrine but a multifaceted attitude with diverse intellectual and practical roots.[3]
Nonviolence is often perceived as a matter of politics or social protest, yet it encompasses far more than acts of public resistance. Scholars such as Judith Butler have argued that it is a misunderstanding of nonviolence as a moral position, proposing instead that it is enacted through relationality and performative speech acts.[4] However, every performative act necessarily presupposes an ethical intention. And that intention, though not always translated into organized action, forms the root of all nonviolent practice. At its core, nonviolence constitutes a moral attitude and a worldview. It is a commitment to human dignity and reconciliation. By examining different figures and communities that upheld such ideals, this study also aims to show that nonviolence could emerge from multiple sources and take diverse forms. Whether expressed through theological conviction, philosophical reasoning, or practical necessity, these ideals and practices reveal how nonviolence became woven into the moral and social fabric of everyday life that everyone can practice under all circumstances.
Reasoned Nonviolence
In recent decades, scholars have sought to pluralize the Enlightenment and to distance its ideas from a singular, universalizing narrative of philosophical history.[5] New definitions were stated and the Enlightenment is now seen by some as a spectrum of ideas.[6] Despite these academic approaches, the Enlightenment and much of Early Modern Europe remain undeniably an age of reason, even for scholars who reject its traditional or monolithic definition.[7] Within this climate, forms of nonviolence grounded in reason began to take shape, most notably through emerging discourses on religious toleration and pacifism. I will therefore provide brief accounts of Desiderius Erasmus, John Locke, and Voltaire, focusing on their ideas and writings that engage with themes of nonviolence.
Desiderius Erasmus: Reason, Faith, and the Rejection of War
Desiderius Erasmus Roterodamus lived from approximately 28 October 1466 to 12 July 1536. He was a Dutch Christian theologian and philosopher whose writings made him one of the most influential moral and intellectual voices of early modern Europe.[8] Erasmus is often seen as a leading figure of the humanist trend in the 16th century, whose intellectual approach centered on the promotion of classical literature and learning.[9] One of Erasmus’s most influential and renowned projects was his Latin translation of the Greek New Testament.[10] Many consider this project a crucial foundation for later vernacular biblical translations and scripture studies, which ultimately contributed to the Protestant Reformation. Yet this is only a tip of the iceberg of Erasmus’ tremendous intellectual contributions. Erasmus’s legacy lies not in a single work, but in the wide scope and diversity of his writings.[11] Among which, his irenic ideal and pacifism stand out as one of the central themes.
The word “pacifism” is often associated with Erasmus and his pursuit of peace.[13] Identified as “untypical of the age,” his pacifist features are sometimes listed together with the Quakers’ absolute pacifism by scholars.[14] Although Erasmus never formulated a systematic doctrine, he regarded peace as where “all the good things of heaven or earth” originate from.[15] His views on peace stem from his faith in both human reason and the principles of Christian values.
Erasmus believed that war and violence in general were irrational and contrary to nature. In A Complaint of Peace, Erasmus indicated that “nature has produced only one animal gifted with reasoning power and possessed of divine insight,” who is capable of good will and concord.[16] Erasmus further established that peace and concord are natural and most fitting for human beings. Nature made humans dependent on one another, lacking natural defenses and gifted unequally to help promote cooperation and exchange. However, princes wage wars against states, scholars draw fierce arguments, and Christians are drowned in disputes and loggerheads. The world is full of “mad,” “insane,” and “intolerable” violence.[17] Why does this happen? It is because reason is falsely abandoned that there is a constant war within humans between reason and passion. While reason is humans’ “duty,” they are often “swayed this way and that by lust, anger, ambition, and service,” and then fallen into “complete disharmony.”[18] Erasmus pointed out that, if people “recall the wars fought during the last twelve years and weigh up the reasons for them,” it will be revealed that lusts and interests rather than reason are the true causes of wars.[19] If a ruler is truly reasonable, then he understands that greatness lies in the well-being of his people, for this is the only reasonable way in which both mutual interest and friendship could be attained.[20] Thus, to act violently is not merely a moral failure but a betrayal of human nature itself, since humans’ divine gift of reason was meant to govern passion and lead to peace. Erasmus concluded that “hardly any peace is so unjust that it is not preferable to a war,” since war is evil because it defies reason and destroys human life, prosperity, and happiness.[21]
Though A Complaint of Peace is the most representative and thorough work, the same idea can be found in other anti-war works of Erasmus. In Dulce Bellum Inexpertis (War is Sweet to Those Who Have Not Experienced It), Erasmus suggested an even more extreme conclusion that, if weighed carefully, under all circumstances, “unjust peace is far better than righteous war.”[22] Moreover, in a satirical tone he pointed out that “all the wars among us Christian men do spring either of foolishness, or else of malice” to highlight and criticize the unreasonable irrationality and corruption.[23] Erasmus finished The Education of a Christian Prince in 1516 and presented it to Prince Charles, the future Charles V, to whom he had been appointed as a counselor. Erasmus wrote in it that “a king does everything and allows everything that will conduce to continuous peace in his country, for he realizes that war is the single source of all sorts of misfortunes to the state.”[24] Here, Erasmus emphasizes the responsibility of rulers to prioritize peace, portraying war as inherently destructive and contrary to the welfare of the state that anyone with reason should not prefer. This shows a fascinating contrast between Erasmus’s work and his contemporary Machiavelli’s advice to Lorenzo de Medici that a ruler “must never stop thinking about war and preparing for war.”[25] In a time of conflicts and realpolitik, Erasmus stood as a bold voice for a philosophy where peace was the highest rational good.
The root of nonviolence does not lie only in reason but also in Christian values for Erasmus. Deeply grieved for the corruption and hostility among Christian communities, Erasmus sought to renew Christianity through a return to the ethical teachings of Christ and classical philosophers, a vision he called the philosophia Christi, which is a rational piety. Cornelis Augustijn suggested that it signifies “a way of life,” one grounded in a deep longing for what is authentic, humane, and unpretentious.[26] Philosophia Christi requires the precise understanding of Christ’s teaching, and is primarily based on the New Testament, and makes a connection between Christ’s teaching and classical philosophies.[27]
In this context, Erasmus frequently drew on Christ’s teachings and scriptural passages to underscore the necessity of peace. In A Complaint of Peace, Erasmus reflected on Christ’s life and teachings that when Christ was born, angels did not sound trumpets of war, and when Christ reached manhood, he taught nothing else but peace.[28] Moreover, directly quoting the scripture, Erasmus emphasized that what Christ gave and left for his people was solely “peace with friends, peace with enemies.”[29] Therefore, since core Christian values demanded the rejection of violence, war is a moral corruption that contradicts the teachings of Christ and hinders one’s practice of philosophia Christi to reach true Christianity eventually. Together with the perception that violence is against reason and harms everything, Erasmus presented a compelling argument to his contemporaries that pacifism is not only necessary and natural, but also favourable.
Although it is undoubtedly true that Erasmus never approved of war, it is notable that some scholars argue that his pacifism is not absolute in the modern sense that he was “not to approve of war but to accept it in case of necessity.”[30] Erasmus once wrote that “if there be anything in the world that should be taken in hand with fear and doubting, yea, that ought by all manner of means to be fled, to be withstood with prayer, and to be clean avoided, verily it is war.”[31] Some interpret this statement to mean that Erasmus acknowledged the possibility of unavoidable wars that must be undertaken as a last resort.[32] This complexity can be further understood in Erasmus’s response to a potential crusade against the Ottoman Turks, which would also serve as a good case study for his application of his theory in reality.
With the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the Ottoman Empire’s further expansion under the leadership of Suleiman the Magnificent, the Christians in Erasmus’s lifetime framed the Ottomans as a threat to Christendom religiously and European states politically.[33] As a result, there was potential for a crusade to be waged against the Turks. This possibility of crusading concerned Erasmus deeply.[34] Overall, although Erasmus never ruled out the possibility of restrained war, he raised a “clear and consistent voice against crusades.”[35]
To argue against launching a crusade, Erasmus presented several arguments in his work A Most Useful Discussion Concerning Proposals for War Against the Turks. Firstly, Erasmus reemphasized his central idea that a war is never preferable since “war is by its very nature such a plague” even when “undertaken by the most just of princes in the most just of causes.”[36] Secondly, Erasmus contended that the Turks represented a divine punishment for the sins of Christendom. Therefore, the proper response was sincere repentance rather than military action.[37] For Erasmus, it will be “futile” to promise Christians a military victory “unless a complete and conspicuous reformation of life takes place throughout Christendom.”[38] Thirdly, Erasmus emphasized that true victory for Christ is converting Turks through faith, not slaughter. Seizing their lands or power only increases pride and emptiness and risks making Christians like the very people they aim to convert.[39] In addition, Erasmus maintained that crusades were full of corruption, hypocrisy, and internal discord, reinforcing his claim that the causes of war are often far from just. He observed that it was “our quarrels, our ambition, our inherent faithlessness that brought about the worst of these disasters.”[40] He also noted that funds raised for crusading “disappeared among the agents… and the hawkers of documents… certainly none of it was put to the use for which it had been collected.”[41] At last, Erasmus also pointed out that this war is impractical and unwinnable.[42] In summary, Erasmus advanced a wide range of arguments against the crusades, appealing to justice, practical outcomes, Christian ethics, and the flourishing of Christendom.
Erasmus did not argue that war was impermissible simply because it was war in this work. Erasmus distinguishes between defensive necessity and offensive war. Though clearly unwillingly, Erasmus acknowledged that there might be an “absolute necessity dictates that a war must inevitably be fought.”[43] He critiques those who “argue against making war on the Turk” just as he critiques those who promote war rashly, for “although not every campaign against the Turks is legitimate and holy, there are cases when failure to oppose the Turk amounts to nothing less than the betrayal of Christendom.”[44] Though only under extremely strict and rare conditions, Erasmus does allow for the possibility of a just war against the Turks.
So, does Erasmus qualify as a pacifist? In a strict or absolute sense, not entirely. Erasmus’s inconsistency in his philosophy is well recognized.[45] Although he at one point suggested that all wars are unjust, he does not appear to hold this position consistently. We may never know what is behind this inconsistency, whether it is due to social pressure, a strategic attempt to persuade princes, a genuine change of conviction, or something else. We can be certain, though, that Erasmus was never a committed absolute pacifist like the early Anabaptists, Quakers, or modern figures like Gandhi.
However, his writings consistently demonstrate a deep aversion to war and a strong commitment to peace and a nonviolent spirit, such that he can be understood as advocating a qualified yet form of pacifism rooted in reason and Christian belief. Erasmus thus stands as a pivotal figure whose “reasoned nonviolence” helped lay an early intellectual foundation for later traditions of toleration, humanitarianism, and morally grounded critiques of violence. Erasmus’s legacy would later be carried forward in various directions in the works of thinkers such as Hugo Grotius, John Locke, Voltaire, Pierre Bayle, and many others.
[1]Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 33.
[2]Ibid.
[3]Gene Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973), 67-68.
[4]Judith Butler, The Force of Nonviolence: An Ethico-Politicaremainl Bind (New York: Verso, 2020), 20.
[5]Ian Hunter, “Multiple Enlightenment,” in The Enlightenment World, ed. Martin Fitzpatrick, Peter Jones, Christa Knellwolf, and Iain McCalman (London: Routledge, 2004), 576.
[6]David Sorkin, The Religious Enlightenment: Protestants, Jews, and Catholics from London to Vienna (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 19-20.
[7]Giorgio Tonelli, “The ‘Weakness’ of Reason in the Age of Enlightenment.” Diderot Studies 14 (1971): 217–218.
[8]Nathan Ron, Erasmus : Intellectual of the 16th Century (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 7.
[9]Ursula Vollerthun and James L. Richardson, “Desiderius Erasmus of Rotterdam,” in The Idea of International Society: Erasmus, Vitoria, Gentili and Grotius (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 29.
[10]Ibid, 30.
[11]Ibid.
[12]J.D. Tracy, “Erasmus.” Encyclopedia Britannica, October 23, 2025. https://www.britannica.com/biography/Erasmus-Dutch-humanist.
[13]Nathan, 4.
[14]F. Hinsley, Power and the Pursuit of Peace: Theory and Practice in the History of Relations between States (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), 16.
[15]Desiderius Erasmus, “A Complaint of Peace Spurned and Rejected by the Whole World,” trans. Betty Radice, in Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 27, ed. A.H.T. Levi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 293.
[16]Ibid, 293-294.
[17]Ibid, 295-298.
[18]Ibid, 299.
[19]Ibid, 307.
[20]Ibid, 312-317.
[21]Ibid, 310-311.
[22]This book is an English translation of Erasmus’s Erasmus against War, the same thing as War is sweet to those who have not experienced it. In 1517 Erasmus wrote the famous Dulce Bellum Inexpertis, which later published in 1534 under the title Bellum Erasmi. Desiderius Erasmus, Erasmus against War with an Introduction by J. W. Mackail, ed. Lewis Einstein (Boston: The Merrymount Press, 1917), 53.
I[23]bid, 58.
[24]Desiderius Erasmus, “The Education of a Christian Prince,” trans. Neil M. Cheshire and Micheal J. Heath, in Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 27, ed. A.H.T. Levi (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 225.
[25]Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince (UK: Penguin Classics, 2003), 58.
[26]Cornelis Augustijn, Erasmus: His Life, Works, and Influence (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1991), 76-77.
[27]Nathan, 88.
[28]Erasmus, A Complaint of Peace, 301.
[29]Ibid, 301.
[30]Vollerthun and Richadson, 64.
[31]Erasmus, Erasmus against War, 4.
[32]Vollerthun and Richadson, 65.
[33]Fred R. Dallmayr, “A War Against the Turks? Erasmus on War and Peace.” Asian Journal of Social Science 34, no.1 (2006): 68.
[34]Nathan, 8.
[35]Ibid, 32.
[36]Desiderius Erasmus, “A Most Useful Discussion Concerning Proposals for War Against the Turks, Including an Exposition of Psalm 28 / Consultatio de bello Turcis inferendo, et obiter enarratus psalmus 28,” in Collected Works of Erasmus: Collected Works of Erasmus, Vol. 64 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 234.
[37]Ibid, 232-233.
[38]Ibid, 260.
[39]Ibid, 242.
[40]Ibid, 232.
[41]Ibid, 248.
[42]Ibid, 261.
[43]Ibid, 235.
[44]Ibid, 232.
[45]Erika Rummel, Erasmus (London: Bloomsbury Publishing Plc, 2006), ix.