By Talia Lunken
Since the partition of Ireland in December of 1920, Northern Ireland has been characterized as a deeply polarized society. Society was split between two ethnonational communities: the nationalist minority (antipartitionist and Catholic) and the unionist majority (partitionist and Protestant). Even prior to World War II, the two communities were almost entirely physically and socially segregated. There were different schools, unions, living areas, newspapers, and sports associated with each side.[1]
Throughout its 50-year history, the Unionist government had excluded Catholics from full participation in the political process.[2]
By the 1960s, a loose network of activists, groups, and organizations (known as the CRM, Civil Rights Movement, network) began to challenge the discriminatory practices. The CRM can be defined as “an informal and heterogeneous network of groups, organizations, and individuals that perceived themselves as united in a broad movement.”[3] The network transformed drastically between 1960 and 1969. They embraced proactive “reformist” civil rights messages focused on constitutional objectives. The intent was to make the regional political system more open and fair.[4]
Inspiration for the early activists was drawn from 1960s movements elsewhere in the world, in particular the civil rights movement in the United States. Between 1949 and 1962 there was an increase in electoral support for political groups that did not take a position on the “partition issue” and the isolated communal subcultures structuring individual’s daily lives and voting behavior began to decline. This gave the early CRM activist ideas of what might be possible. The minority community became moderately optimistic about the direction the regional political situation was moving. In fall of 1968, the CRM network reached its highest level of media coverage. Majority of the leaders aspired to the idea of a united Ireland, however not openly connecting it with the goals of the movement.[5]
By 1968, the reformist message and nonviolent tactics were transformed from the apathy and incapacity of the political establishment to answer the CRM’s demand on policing, electoral, and housing reforms. Practices were still nonviolent, but moved aggressively into the streets with more radical and unconventional messages. The Unionist establishment’s reluctance to reform as well as the rise of a violent Loyalist countermovement also pushed for the CRM to radicalize their message. The new strategic goals were to “increase pressure and orient elites through street protests and the resulting media attention.”[6] The new message directly changed the legitimacy of the region’s political system, using a form of symbolic provocation inspired by Northern Irish tradition of communal marches and parades, combined with nonviolent confrontational action drawn from the U.S. civil rights movement. It is important to note that the CRM network was not unanimous in the “radical” shift.[7]
On October 5, 1968, at one of the early civil rights marches, a “transformative event” occurred in Londonderry. This was the second march under that new tactical message, and the Royal Ulster Constabulary, the state police force, responded violently by beating unarmed demonstrators with batons. Violent images of police brutality were captured and shown throughout the world. To the right is an image of the march.[8] This violence confirmed the new messaging of the CRM that the authorities were not willing to listen to. The civil rights issue was transmitted broadly via mass media and as a measure of the importance of the event; 17 more demonstrations and marches were staged in the next seven weeks.[9]
[8]
Protests in 1969 became increasingly associated with violent rioting. Demands for reform in “housing allocation, the franchise and employment discrimination were replaced by the aim of reunifying Ireland and expelling the British state from Northern Ireland.”[10] There was a transition from civil protest to violence.
In 1969, the British had 2,500 troops in Northern Ireland, supplementing local and predominantly Protestant police. The number raised to 22,500 in 1972, and by 1979 there were still 13,500 troops. Between 1968 and 1980, approximately 2,100 people died in the struggle.[11]
Another shift occurred in February 1972 following what became known as Bloody Sunday. On January 30, 1972, British paratroopers massacred 13 men in an illegal demonstration in the Bogside.[12] This stimulated nonviolent marches, strikes, and days of mourning all over both Northern Ireland and Ireland.[13]
The Civil Rights movements’ grievances were centered on partial disenfranchisement, plural voting, gerrymandering, discrimination in employment and housing, and regime emergency powers. The movement employed civil protest as a primary tool in addressing the grievances of the minority community. Demonstrations and advocacy were ways in which the movement sought reforms in public services and government structures that had historically marginalized minority groups. There were some tangible changes to the efforts, which included, the abolition of the business vote, temporary replacement of inequitable local governments, promises to reconsider oppressive legislature, and objective housing allocations.
Despite these changes, the fundamental issues of the Unionist government as a monopoly remained largely unchanged. There was a tightening grip on security measures with the decision of the government to disarm the police and to deploy the British Army for riot control. Although there were calls for more inclusivity and minority participation in decision making, the Unionist Party dominated the political landscape. Government crackdowns and the emergency of violent insurgency can be attributed to the decline of political protest. Overall, mobilization of minority communities and the challenging of the regime can be chalked up to civil protest and the crucial role it played. The movement fell short of addressing the systemic issues in governance in Northern Ireland.[14]
1 Bosi, Lorenzo. “The Dynamics of Social Movement Development: Northern Ireland’s Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2006): 81-100.
2 Ellison, Graham, and Greg Martin. “Policing, Collective Action and Social Movement Theory: The Case of the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Campaign.” The British Journal of Sociology 51, no. 4 (December 2000): 681–699. doi:10.1080/00071310020015325.
3 Bosi, Lorenzo. “The Dynamics of Social Movement Development: Northern Ireland’s Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2006): 81-100.
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Dorney, John. “Revisiting the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement: 1968-69.” Revisiting the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Movement: 1968-69 – The Irish Story, December 3, 1970. Accessed March 20, 2024. https://www.theirishstory.com/2018/12/03/revisiting-the-northern-ireland-civil-rights-movement-1968-69/.
9 Bosi, Lorenzo. “The Dynamics of Social Movement Development: Northern Ireland’s Civil Rights Movement in the 1960s.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 11, no. 1 (2006): 81-100.
10 Ó Dochartaigh, Niall. “What Did the Civil Rights Movement Want?: Changing Goals and Underlying Continuities in the Transition from Protest to Violence.” In The Troubles in Northern Ireland and Theories of Social Movements, edited by Lorenzo Bosi and Gianluca De Fazio, 33–52. Amsterdam University Press, 2017. Accessed March 20, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv56fgn2.5.
11 Lee, Alfred McClung. “Nonviolent Agencies in the Northern Ireland Struggle: 1968-1979.” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 7, no. 4 (July 1980): 601-623.
12 Power, Paul F. “Civil Protest in Northern Ireland.” Journal of Peace Research 9, no. 3 (1972): 223–236. Accessed March 21, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/423357.
13 Lee, Alfred McClung. “Nonviolent Agencies in the Northern Ireland Struggle: 1968-1979.” Journal of Sociology and Social Welfare 7, no. 4 (July 1980): 601-623.
14Power, Paul F. “Civil Protest in Northern Ireland.” Journal of Peace Research 9, no. 3 (1972): 223–236. Accessed March 21, 2024. http://www.jstor.org/stable/423357.